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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this matter is before the Supreme Court
based on Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and
§78-2-2, Utah Code
trial

court's

Annotated.

ruling

The

resolved

parties

all

believe

that

before

it,

issues

the
but,

alternatively, the trial court certified the ruling for appeal
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for review arise out of the question
of the validity of Salt Lake County's 1984 final May tax sale
of the subject property.
The

trial

court

All

issues

judgment.
standard

of

correctness,

review
with

on
no

ruled
are

on

cross-motions

purely

each

is,

deference

legal

summary

conclusions.

therefore,

accorded

for

a

the

review

trial

The
for

court's

decision, and all facts and inferences therefrom are construed
in the

light most

favorable to Appellant.

Blue Cross & Blue

Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989).
More specifically, the issues are as follows:
1.

Did the trial court

err

in upholding

the

1984 tax

sale by Salt Lake County in the face of Shelledy's claim that
it was void for lack of jurisdiction because of the immunity of
the

federal

government's

agency,

the

Small

Business

that

Shelledy's

Administration (hereinafter SBA).
2.
claim

Did

against

the trial court
the

1984

statutes of limitations?

tax

err

in ruling

sale was

barred

by

the

special

3.

Did the trial court err

in

ruling

that

Shelledy

lacked standing to dispute the validity of the 1984 tax sale?
STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION MAY BE DETERMINATIVE
Utah Code Annotated, Sections:
78-12-5.1 Seizure or possession
seven years — Proviso — Tax title.

within

No action for the recovery of real
property or for the possession thereof shall be
maintained/
unless
the
plaintiff
or
his
predecessor was seized or possessed of such
property
within
seven
years
from
the
commencement of such action; provided, however,
that with respect to actions or defenses
brought or interposed for the recovery or
possession of or to quiet title or determine
the ownership of real property against the
holder of a tax title to such property, no such
action or defense shall be commenced or
interposed more than four years after the date
of the tax deed, conveyance, or transfer
creating such tax title unless the person
commencing
or
interposing
such action or
defense
or
his
predecessor
has
actually
occupied or been in possession of such property
within four years prior to the commencement or
interposition of such action or defense or
within one year from the effective date of this
amendment.
78-12-5.2
Holder
of
tax
title
Limitations of action or defense — Proviso.
No action or defense for the recovery or
possession of real property or to quiet title
or determine the ownership thereof shall be
commenced or interposed against the holder of a
tax title after the expiration of four years
from the date of the sale, conveyance or
transfer of such tax title to any county, or
directly to any other purchaser thereof at any
public or private tax sale and after the
expiration of one year from the date of this
act.
Provided, however, that this section
shall not bar any action or defense by the
owner of the legal title to such property where
he or his predecessor has actually occupied or

-2-

been in actual possession of such property
within four years from the commencement or
interposition of such action or defense. And
provided further, that this section shall not
bar any defense by a city or town, to an action
by the holder of a tax title, to the effect
that such city or town holds a lien against
such property which is equal or superior to the
claim of the holder of such tax title.
78-12-5.3
"action:".

Definitions

of

"tax

title:

and

(1) The terms "tax title" as used in
§78-12-5.1
and §59-2-1364, and the related
amended §§78-12-5, 78-12-7, and 78-12-12, means
any title to real property whether valid or
not, which has been derived through or is
dependent
upon
any
sale,
conveyance,
or
transfer of property
in the course of a
statutory proceeding for the liquidation of any
tax levied against the property whereby the
property is relieved from a tax lien.
(2) The word "action" as used in these
sections
includes
counterclaims
and
crosscomplaints
and
all
civil
actions
wherein
affirmative relief is sought.
59-2-1366 Preliminary sale to county. At
12:00 noon on January 15, all real estate
subject to a lien for any taxes which are then
delinquent is considered to have been sold to
the county at a preliminary sale to pay the
taxes, penalty, and costs for which the real
estate is liable.
59-2-1346
Installments

Redemption

-

Time

allowed

(1) Real estate taken over by the county
for delinquent taxes may be redeemed by any
person having an interest at any time the
property
is
held
by
the
county
under
preliminary tax sale but prior to the day of
the final tax sale following the lapse of four
years from the date of preliminary sale. The
redemption shall be made by the person paying
into the county treasury the amount due the
county, all taxes subsequently assessed, and
all interest, penalty , and costs that have

-3-

accrued. Property may not be redeemed after
the expiration
of
the
redemption
period
specified.
(2) At any time prior to the expiration of
the period of redemption the county treasurer
shall accept and credit on account for the
redemption of property sold for delinquent
taxes, payments in amounts of not less than
$10, except for the final payment, which may be
in any amount. For the purpose of computing
the amount required for redemption and for the
purpose of distributing the payments received
on account, all payments shall be applied in
the following order:
(a) against the interest accrued on the
delinquent tax for the last year included in
the delinquent account at the time of payment;
(b) against . the penalty charged on the
delinquent tax for the last year included in
the delinquent account at the time of payment;
(c) against the delinquent tax for the
last year included in the delinquent account at
the time of payment;
(d) against the interest accrued on the
delinquent tax for the next to last year
included in the delinquent account at the time
of payment;
(e) and so on until the full amount of the
delinquent tax, penalty, and interest on the
unpaid balances are paid within the period of
redemption.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The

real

property

in dispute

herein

is described

follows:
Beginning at a point which is North 660 ft.
from the Southwest Corner of the Northwest
Quarter of Sec. 29, Township 3 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Base and meridian, and running
thence North 220 ft.; thence West 990 ft,;
thence South 220 ft.; thence East 990 ft. to
the point of beginning.
-4-

as

Subject to a 49.5 ft. right of way for Utah
Lake Irrigation Co. canal and to a right of way
over the East portion for 1000 East Street.
and is situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. R78.
The

Small

Business

acquired

its

interest

property

by

quit-claim

Administration

in

and

deed

to

the

dated

(hereinafter

"SBA")

above-described

January

14,

real

1981, and

recorded in Book 5246, page 836 as entry number 356 3244 in the
Salt Lake County Recorder's Office.
At

the

time

the

SBA

R78, 86-87.

acquired

its

interest

in

the

property, the property had been sold to Salt Lake County at a
preliminary sale to pay the taxes, penalty and costs for taxes
due and owing on November 30, 1978, pursuant to §59-2-1336,
Utah Code Annotated (1988).

R79, 87.

On or before the 1984 May tax sale, the SBA received
notice by certified mail of the pending tax sale, but did not
redeem said property.

Edward Lore purchased the property from

Salt Lake County at the May tax sale. R87.
At the time of the 1984 May tax sale, taxes were due and
owing for 1978, 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1983, in the total amount
of $5,408.63.

R87.

A tax deed was executed by the Salt Lake

County Auditor on May 23, 1984, and recorded on August 2,
1984.

R79.

The action to quiet title in the plaintiff was

commenced on or about March 3, 1989. R2.
Appellant has not occupied
subject of this action.

R88.

the premises which are the

The property is an undeveloped

-5-

vacant lot.

R140, p. 11 and 12.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In 1979, the subject real property was sold to Salt Lake
County

at preliminary tax sale for taxes due and owing in

1978.

On or about May 23, 1984, said property was sold at the

tax sale to Edward Lore.

Prior to said sale, Salt Lake County

gave notice by certified mail of the pending tax sale to the
SBA.

The SBA purported to own said property by virtue of a

quit-claim deed executed and recorded in 1981.

Despite notice

of the pending tax sale, the SBA failed to redeem said property0
Salt Lake County asserts that this action is barred by
the statute of limitations; that the sovereign immunity of the
United States does not protect Appellant; that the SBA acquired
from its grantors, a statutory right of redemption which it
failed

to

created

exercise.

statutory

Having

right,

failed

the

to

SBA's

exercise

right

to

the

state

redeem

was

extinguished by the May tax sale.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S ACTION IS BARRED
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The tax deed was executed by the Salt Lake County Auditor
on May 23, 1984 and recorded on August 2, 1984.

Appellant's

action was commenced on or about March 10, 1989, beyond the
statutory period provided in §78-12-5.1 and §78-12-5.2, Utah
Code

Ann.

(1953)

(1988)

(hereinafter

-6-

"special

statute

of

limitations") and thus is time barred.
P.2d

884

(Utah

1955);

Frederiksen

Hansen v. Morris, 293

v.

LaFluer,

632

P.2d

827

(Utah 1981); Kemmerer Coal Company v. Briqham Young University,
723 F.2d 54 (10th Cir. 1983).
In Hansen
plaintiff,

v. Morris,

the

defendants

tax sale purchaser, had

failed

asserted
to

prove

that

the

that

all

statutory steps incident to the tax sale had occurred and hence
the purchaser did not have valid title.

The Court noted that

no claim had been made that the deed was void on its face or
that it was not issued by the proper governmental authority.
In upholding the constitutionality of the special statute
of limitations applicable to tax sales, the Court rejected the
argument that the statute of limitations barring challenges to
tax

sale

deeds

should

be

construed

differently

than

other

statutes of limitations, which validate certain conveyances by
virtue of the passage of time.

The court stated as follows:

In holding such sections valid, we can see
no merit in any argument to the effect that if
any of the statutory steps necessary to perfect
a tax title have not been taken, such as
failure to give notice of sale, failure of the
auditor to execute affidavits, etc., compels
the conclusion that title remains in the record
owner, hence no title passes, hence any claim
by the county and/or its grantee by tax deed is
invalid, hence the statute of limitations does
not apply. The same argument could be leveled
against other statutes of limitations where the
authorities have validated a situation where
one becomes the owner absolute of the property
of another, without conveyance of any kind, but
merely as an adjunct of the passage of time and
the
performance
of
statutorily
prescribed
conditions.
The same argument also could be
leveled
against
the so-called
prima
facie

-7-

statutes which legitimize such shifting of
unconveyed
title
by
permitting
certain
documents to establish, prima facie, facts
therein
recited
or
the
regularity
of
proceedings theretofore had, where such prima
facie evidence is either not attacked or
survives an attack, even though later it
develops
that
occurrences
prior
to
the
adduction of such evidence have prevented such
shifting of title had they been urged before
such evidence was adduced.
293 P.2d at 886.
Since the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Hansen v.
Morris, the Court has addressed the application of the statute
of

limitations

to

tax

sales

in two

cases, Frederiksen

LaFluer, and Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974 (Utah 1982).

v.

With

respect to the special statute of limitations, in Frederiksen
v. LaFluer, the Court upheld its validity:
Sections
78-12-5.1
and
78-12-5.2 bar
actions or defenses against "the holder of a
tax title."
Section 78-12-5.3 defines "tax
title" as "any title to real property, whether
valid or not," derived from a tax sale. Our
Legislature could hardly have expressed itself
more clearly. This Court has often cited and
applied §78-12-5o3 to permit holders of invalid
or questionable tax titles to claim protection
under the special limitations statute. Kanawha
and Hocking Coal and Coke Company v. Carbon
County, supra (tax title assumed invalid);
Layton v. Holt, supra (tax title alleged
invalid due to county auditor's failure to
attach affidavit to assessment roll); Peterson
v. Callister, supra (tax title "technically may
not have passed" due to county's failure to
follow various statutory steps); Hansen v.
Morris, supra (tax title not perfected due to
failure to comply with necessary statutory
steps) . We see no reason to depart from these
precedents or to reject the plain meaning of
the statute.
632 P.2d at 831.
-8-

Further,
proceedings

notwithstanding

rendered

the

the

deed

fact

the

invalid

the

tax

sale

action

was

nonetheless barred by the statute of limitations.

In footnote

14 at page 831, the Court in Frederiksen v. LaFleur
its

opinion

limitations
repugnant

on

the

where
to

application

the

tax

of

title

fundamental

the

is

special

acquired

fairness

or

reserved

statute

by

of

".•.means

whether

such

an

application of the statute would exceed the limits of statutory
intent or constitutional permissability."
In Dillman v. Foster, a tax title purchaser, who was the
former record title holder, attempted to defeat the title of a
party

who

was

his

own

successor

grantee

application of the statute of limitations.
permit

a

tax

title

purchaser

to

by

urging

the

The Court would not

strengthen

his

title

to

property by buying at tax sale when the property was sold as a
consequence

of

his

omission

to

pay

taxes.

State

and

addressed

the

noted

footnote

Local

Taxation 72 AmJur.2d §941.
Although
which

it

this

reserved

court
its

LaFleur,

has

not

opinion

considered

it

University.

In applying Frederiksen, the Court of Appeals held

Coal

Circuit
Co.

Court
v.

of

14 of

v.

Kemmerer

Tenth

in

on

Frederiksen

in

the

as

subject

Brigham

Appeals
Young

that a due process challenge to the validity of the tax sale,
which would otherwise be barred by the statute of
was

not

a violation

of the Frederiksen

standard.

limitations
The court

held it was not "fundamentally unfair" to apply the statute of

-9-

limitations to the purchaser from the record title holder "in
the face of record notice of a rival claim.. ." Kemmerer Coal
Co. v. Briqham Young University, 723 F.2d at 58.
As in Kemmerer, the only possible constitutional claim is
that Shelledy's predecessor in interest had its rights violated
by the tax sale.

But Shelledy also had notice of the rival

claim to the property by virtue of the 1984 tax deed.

Under

the Tenth Circuit's analysis, Shelledy's claim sould also be
barred.
POINT II
EVEN THOUGH THE TAX SALE MAY HAVE BEEN
INVALID THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
BARS THIS ACTION
The Appellant has never contended that the 1984 tax deed
was void on its face.

Shelledy claims the deed is void because

the SBA's interest in the property remov€*d the property from
the County's taxing jurisdiction.

His argument

is that any

sale of the property for taxes would be void; if a tax sale is
void

the

statute

of

limitations

will

not

run.

However,

Shelledy's contention is not supported by the authorities he
relies upon and is not the law in Utah.
The Appellant contends that Hansen v. Morris, supports
his argument that the statute of limitations will not run if a
deed is void for lack of jurisdiction.

In Hansen v. Morris,

the Court held that the statute of limitations will not run if
the deed is void on its face.

It also held that the statute

will run if the tax deed is valid on its face and issued by the

-10-

proper governmental authority:
In passing, we do not wish it understood
that our decision is applicable to conveyances
void on their face, such as those containing no
grantor, grantee, description, etc., or to
those that may be forged or the like, but only
to those valid on their face, as here, and
executed by the same authority that could have
passed good title if each and every statutory
step in perfecting
a tax title had
been
followed,
without
the
aid
of
limitations
statute.^-2 (emphasis added)
283 P.2d at 887.
None of the cases cited in the footnote 12 address the
issue raised by the Appellant

and the statute of

was held in each case to bar the action.
So.

290

(Miss.

1940)

(two

year

statute

limitations

Jones v. Russell, 194
of

limitations

is

intended to cut off inquiry into the merits of the validity of
the tax sale); Strauss v. Thompson, 71 P.2d

994

(Okla. 1935)

(action to cancel tax deed which was not void on its face is
barred

by

General

the

one

Electric

year

statute

Company,

104

of
P.2d

limitations);
912

(Wash.

Eagles
1940)

v.
(the

statute of limitations will run even though a deed is void).
Further Baxter v. Utah Department of Transportation, 783
P.2d
1990),

1045
does

(Ut.App.
not

1989),

support

cert,

denied

133

his position either.

U.A.R.

18

(Utah

In Baxter

the

issue before the Court was whether the property which had been
sold at tax sale was situated in Davis or Weber County.

It was

contended that the tax deed from Davis County was void because
the property was located in Weber County and as a result Davis
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County "had no authority to tax the property, to acquire title
when taxes were
deed."

unpaid,

or

to

convey

title

through

a tax

inapplicable.

Davis

County

Baxter, 783 P.2d 1045, 1047.
Clearly

Baxter

is

wholly

could not convey a valid title through tax sale to property
situated in another county.

A statute of limitations defense

in Baxter would have failed under the standard articulated by
the Court in Hansen and Frederiksen.
Appellant
property

asserts

contends

"the

that

statute

application to void deeds."
§2766 (1978).
several

a

leading
of

authority

limitations

in

is

real

without

Vol. 5B Thompson, Real Property,

The above quote is footnoted with reference to

cases.

Those

cases

reveal

that

the

scope

of

the

assertion is primarily limited to deeds void on their face.
Pierce v. Barrett, 220 P. 652 (Okla. 1923); Adams v. Mottley,
223 P. 356 (Okla. 1924) (tax deed defective on its face is not
sufficient to set statute of limitations in operation);
v. E.W. Gates Lbr. Co., 98 S. 722
limitations

Loper

(Ala. 1923) (statute of

inapplicable to tax sale where owner paid taxes

before sale); Goodrich v. Parr, 256 S.W. 868 (Ark. 1923) (tax
deed

void

due

to defect on face of deed hence statute of

limitations does not run); Harana v. Gheens Realty Co., 98 S.
812 (La. 1923) (statute of limitations does not run against tax
deeds

which

did

not

include

property

within

tax

deed

description).
Appellant refers to P. Lear, Utah's Short Statutes of
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Limitations for Tax Titles: The Continuing Specter of Lvman v.
National

Mortgage

Bond

Corp,,

—

A

Need

for

Remedial

Legislation, 76 BYU L.Rev. 457, 467 (1976) for authority that
where a deed is void due to jurisdictional defect the statute
of limitations favoring tax deeds do not run.

Appellant has

misinterpreted Lear's statement which is set forth in pertinent
part as follows:
Special or short statutes of limitation do
not run where the tax deed is absolutely void
on its face—not merely voidable—due to some
jurisdictional
defect
or
where
the
jurisdictional defect, not apparent on the face
of the deed, entails an irregularity in the
proceedings...
...In most states, however, where the deed
is valid on its face and is voidable merely for
some irregularity in the proceedings, the
limiting
statute
runs
from
the date of
execution and delivery of the deed or, in some
cases, from the date of recording, regardless
of possession.
P. Lear, Ibid., p. 468.
Lear

identified

examples

of

jurisdictional

defects

follows:
48. Bird v. Benlisa, 142 U.S. 664 (1892);
Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310, 283 P.2d 884
(1955).
Examples of jurisdictional defects
include situations in which (1) the land sold
at the tax sale was not subject to taxation:
(2) the land sold was not subject to the taxes
for which it was sold, Mecham v. Mel-O-Tone
Enterprises, 23 Utah 2d 403, 464 P.2d 392
(1970); (3) taxes for which the land was sold
were
never
assessed,
Huntington
City v.
Peterson, 30 Utah 2d 408, 518 P.2d 1246 (1974);
(4) the
assessment
was void,
Keller v.
Chournos, 102 Utah 535, 133 P.2d 318 (1943);
and (5) the taxes had been paid, and there had
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as

been an incorrect duplicate assessment, Cameron
Estates, Inc. v. Deering, 308 N.Y. 24, 123
N.E.2d 621 (1954). (Emphasis added)
P. Lear, Ibid at 467.
The statute of limitations will run, even though the tax
deed is voidable due to a jurisdictional desfect such as alleged
by Appellant.

This court specifically adopted this reasoning

in Hansen v. Morris and in Frederiksen v. LaFluer, when it held
that the statute of limitations would bar a challenge to the
tax deed even though the tax deed was invalid.
In conclusion, neither Hansen v. Morris, Baxter v. Davis
County, nor the scholarly authorities support the Appellant's
argument that the deed is void.

The deed is valid on its face

and issued by Salt Lake County which had taxing jurisdiction
over the subject property.
POINT III
THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF THE UNITED
STATES IS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE
Despite Appellant's representations, he is asserting the
constitutional

rights

of

the United

States when

he

raises

sovereign immunity as a basis to void the tax sale by Salt Lake
County.
Supremacy

The doctrine of sovereign immunity arises from the
Clause, U.S. Constitution, Art. VI, cl.2.

United

States v. New Mexico, 71 L.Ed.2d 580, 102 S.Ct. 1373 (1982).
Appellant

has

cited

several

cases

in

support

of his

assertion in Point V of his brief that he has standing to raise
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the issue of the validity of the tax deed.
contends

the Appellant

immunity

of the United

Salt Lake County

lacks standing to assert the sovereign
States to invalidate

the deed

in the

context of the statute of limitations defense.
This contention

arises

from

the

decision

of

the

Tenth

Circuit Court of Appeals in Kemmerer Coal Co. v. Brigham Young
University,
Company

wherein

had

no

the

court

standing

to

held

that

assert

the

the

Kemmerer

violation

of

Coal
the

constitutional rights of its grantor as a basis to void a tax
sale otherwise barred for lack of timeliness by the statute of
limitations.
Kemmerer
rights of
County

Coal

Company

its grantor,

because

San

San

Rafael

asserted
Rafael

that

had

received

been

no

the

due

violated

notice

of

process
by

the

the

tax

assessment and received only publication notice of the sale of
the coal rights.
owners.

This notice listed strangers to the title as

The court acknowledged that San Rafael's

rights

may

have

been

violated

by

Emery

asserted that the statute of limitations did

due process

County.

Kemmerer

not bar the due

process attack on the title derived from the tax deed grantee
because the tax title was void for lack of due process.
court

rejected

that

argument

and

stated

its

reasoning

follows:
...Kemmerer itself has suffered no due
process injury.
If a constitutional violation
occurred, it was the taking of San Rafael's
property without due process.
Kemmerer thus
seeks to advance its claim by asserting a
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The
as

M
third-party's constitutional rights.
[T]he
general rule is that a
litigant may only
assert
his
own
constitutional
rights or
immunities." (citations omitted)

***

We believe the Utah Supreme Court would
hold that Kemmerer has no standing to assert a
third-party's constitutional rights under the
facts of this case. While it may have been
"repugnant
to
fundamental
fairness,"
Frederiksen, 632 P.2d at 831 n. 14, to deprive
San Rafael of its property without proper
notice, we do not believe it fundamentally
unfair to apply the statute of limitations to
Kemmerer who bought the coal lands in the face
of
record
notice of
a rival
claim
to
"underground rights."
723 F.2d at 57-58.
Similarly, it is not fundamentally unfair or in excess of
constitutional
limitations

permissability

to

bar

to

Appellant's

apply
quiet

the
title

statute
action

of
when

Appellant asserts an immunity solely that of the United States
and when on notice of a rival claim due to a 1984 tax sale deed.
None of the cases cited by appellant in support if its
claim to standing involve challenges to the validity of a tax
deed when the statute of limitations has been raised
defense.
(Fla.

as a

Further, the case of Daniel v. Sherrill, 48 So.2d 736

1950),

cited

by

Appellant,

involved

the

defense

of

estoppel raised by the tax deed purchasers against the State of
Florida.

The State had succeeded to the interest of the United

States in certain property which the State had previously sold
at tax sale at a time it was held by the United States.
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The

court held the state was estopped from asserting the invalidity
of its own sale on grounds of equity and was barred by its own
tax

sale

documents

property.

Notably

which
the

purported

statute

of

to

convey

limitations

title
had

to

not

the
been

raised as a defense.
Even if this court were to find Shelledy could assert the
sovereign

immunity

of

the

United

States,

sovereign immunity is not without limit.
Mexico, 71 L.Ed.2d

580.

the

doctrine

of

United States v. New

Under the circumstances of this case,

the doctrine does not apply.
In State and Local Taxation, 71 AmJur. 2d §224, a general
discussion of sovereign immunity is set forth in pertinent part
as follows:
The principle which prevents a state from
levying
a tax which will curtail in any
substantial manner the exercise of the powers
of the Federal Government has its inherent
limitations. Its application must be practical
and
have
regard
for
the
circumstances
disclosed.
The end sought to be attained is
important. The immunity is for the protection
of the government, and extends no further than
is necessary for that purpose.
It does not
extend to anything lying outside or beyond
governmental functions and their exertion. It
does not exist where no direct burden is laid
upon the governmental instrumentality and there
is only a remote, if any, influence upon the
exercise of the functions of the government,
[citations omitted].
Shelledy

has

failed

to prove

any direct

burden on the

government or influence on the exercise of the function of the
government.

He asserts that to deprive a grantee of property
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received from the United States would constitute a taking of
property from the federal government since the government would
not be able to alienate marketable property.
may be less marketable

The fact property

is not the burden intended to cause

application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

Northside

Canal Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 8 F.2d 73 9 (Wyo.
1925).
The United States Supreme Court has held that property
purchased

by

a private

person

from

the

federal

government

becomes a part of the general mass of property in the state and
must bear its fair share of the expenses of local government,
even though the prospect of taxation by the state may reduce
the amount that the United States might receive from the sale
of its property*

Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texas Co., 336

U.S. 342, 93 L.Ed. 721 (1948).
Thus Shelledy can not assert a burden which was not borne
by

the United

States

as

a reason

to

cloak

sovereign immunity of the United States.
remote.

him

with

the

The burden if any is

Because it is remote, sovereign

immunity

does not

protect him.
The

Appellant

further

asserts

that

the

statute

of

limitations could not commence to run while the title to the
property was in the Small Business Administration and thus this
action

is

not

barred

by

the

defense

of

the

statute

of

limitations.
As a general rule, the statute of limitations does not
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run against the sovereign.
§409.

Limitation of Actions, 51 AmJur.2d

However where the government has no real interest in the

litigation,
available

the
the

individuals.

defense
same

of

as

Limitations

the

if

statute

the

of

litigation

limitations
were

of Actions, 51 AmJur.2d

is

between

§410.

Thus

even if the United States were a nominal party and this action
brought in its name, if the United States has no real interest
in the litigation and the benefit to come from the litigation
will

inure to the benefit of an individual such as Shelledy,

the statute of limitations may be asserted as a defense to the
suit.

McNutt v. Cox, 129 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. 1930); Limitations

of Actions , 51 AmJur.2d §410.
The Appellant has failed to cite any cases which support
his position that the statute of limitations is not a valid bar
to his claim even though
Clearly

the Appellant

party in interest.
right

to

control

Preston v.

the grantor was

and not

the United

the United
States

States.

is the real

A real party in interest is one who has the
and

receive

Iron County,

the

314 N.W.2d

fruits

of

the

litigation.

131, 134 (Wis.App. 1981).

If Appellant prevails the appellant will have set aside the tax
deed

issued

himself.

by

Salt

Lake

County

and

will

quiet

title

in

Under such circumstances, the fact the United States

may have been in the chain of title does not affect the running
of the statute of limitations as it applies to the Appellant's
claim.
Further, the interest of the SBA in the property was the
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right

to

exercise

redemption.

the

state

created

statutory

right

of

Where an action is brought under a state statute

which creates a right which did not exist at common law, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity will not apply.

Limitation of

Actions, §51 AmJur.2d §414. Thompson v. Avery, 39 P. 829 (Utah
1895) .
POINT IV
THE 1984 MAY TAX SALE WAS VALID
Utah

law

provides

two

statutory

methods

by

which

delinquent real property taxes may be collected by the taxing
authority..
in

the

One is a summary administrative tax sale proceeding

nature

of

forfeiture

and

foreclosure of the tax liens.

the other

Initially

is a judicial

once

taxes

become

delinquent two events occur; a lien attaches as of January 1 of
each year (§59-2-1325) and all real estate subject to a lien
for delinquent taxes is considered to have been sold to the
County at a preliminary sale on January 15 (§59-2-1336),
The

summary

preliminary

sale

administrative
of

the

proceedings

property

to

the

arise

from the

County.

Once

a

preliminary sale occurs, the treasurer is required to make a
record of the property sold, including a description of the
tract sold

(§59-2-1338(1) (b)); and the amount

for which the

property was sold at preliminary tax sale (§59-2-1338(1)(c)).
On or before March 31 the treasurer is then required to
certify

the

record

of

the
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preliminary

tax

sale

(§59-2-1339(1)).

The record is the official tax sale record

and is maintained in the treasurer's office (§59-2-1339(2)).
If property is not redeemed by March 31 following the
lapse of four years from the date of the preliminary tax sale,
the

property

is

listed

for

the

"Final

May

Tax

Sale"

(§59-2-1343).
Real estate taken over by the County for delinquent taxes
may be redeemed by any person having an interest at any time
the property is held by the County under preliminary sale but
prior to the day of the final tax sale (§59-2-1346(1)).
Upon receiving the Final May Tax Sale listing from the
treasurer, the auditor shall advertise all real estate sold at
preliminary sale and not previously redeemed and upon which the
period of redemption is expiring (§59-2-1351).
Thereafter the auditor executes a deed conveying in the
sale all property sold at the public sale to the purchaser
(§59-2-1352(1-6)).
An entirely separate remedy is set forth in §59-2-1353
wherein the County may foreclose its lien by an action in the
District Court.

The foreclosure remedy is an additional remedy

and may not deprive the County of any other method or means
provided

for

the

collection

or

enforcement

of

any taxes.

(§59-2-1358).
Appellant's

interest is founded upon a quit-claim deed

from the SBA, which founded its interest upon a quit-claim deed
received from Clair R. And Virginia S. Pearson.
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"Such deeds do

not imply the conveyance of any particular
property...Plaintiffs

acquired

only

the

grantors, be that interest what it may."

interest

interest

of

in the
their

Nix v. Tooele County,

118 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah 1941).
At the time of the conveyance to the SBA, the Pearson's
transferred their statutory right to redeem the property which
had been sold at preliminary tax sale to Salt Lake County.

The

right of redemption afforded the grantors is a statutory right
pursuant to §59-2-1346, which amended §59-10-56.

M

The right of

redemption is not personal to the owner at the time of the tax
sale; while it is not an estate in land, it is a statutory
privilege which passes to the heir of the owner in the same
manner

as

the

land

itself."

State

and Local Taxation, 72

AmJur.2d §999; Belmore v. State Tax Commission, 245 Po2d 149
(N.M. 1952); Yates v. Hawkins, 126 P.2d 476 (N.M. 1926) . The
statutory right to redeem is not considered a vested property
right.

Jackson

v.

Hartley,

564 P.2d

992

(N.M.

1977).

A

quit-claim deed may pass a right to redeem property sold for
delinquent taxes.

Deeds, 23 AmJur.2d §339; Bateman v. Donovan,

131 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1942).
In Belmore v. State Tax Commission, the court held that a
quit-claim deed executed after the tax deed to the state had
been executed and delivered did not convey title because title
was

in the state by virtue of the tax deed

County.

issued by the

The quit-claim deed did convey the statutory right of

redemption held by the grantor.
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The court in Belmore further held that the quit-claim
deed was void as a conveyance of title because it was executed
and delivered subsequent to the conveyance by tax deed to the
state of the lots in question.
Thus the conveyance by quit-claim deed from the Pearsons
to the SBA transferred

their statutory right of redemption.

The SBA did not exercise the right of redemption and thus lost
the

statutory

right

by

its

failure.

Company, 583 P.2d 76 (Utah 1978).
Small

Business

Administration

Rushton v. Saoe Land

The fact the grantee was the
does

not

create

a

greater

interest in the property than that which its grantor had.

Nix

v. Tooele County.
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue of the
status

of

a

county's

tax

lien

property to a sovereign entity.

following

transfer

of

the

In State v. Salt Lake County,

85 P. 2d 851 (Utah 1938), the mortgagor borrowed money from the
State of Utah in 1924 and mortgaged the land as security for
payment.

Subsequently, the mortgagor defaulted in his payments

and when

faced with

foreclosure, executed

a warranty

deed

conveying the mortgaged property to the State on December 16,
1936.
in

Meanwhile, the property was assessed and sold for taxes

1932

to Salt Lake County.

Taxes for 1933 through 1936

accrued and, upon failure to redeem and notwithstanding record
title

in the State of Utah, the County Auditor deeded the

property on April 15, 1937 to the County in satisfaction of the
taxes.

The State brought suit to quiet title to the property
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in itself.

In dismissing the State's complaint to quiet title,

the Court wrote as follows:
If the taxes for 1932 to 1936 inclusive
were lawfully levied against this property as
that of [the mortgagor], and we have so held,
then by what process of reasoning can they be
adjudged unlawful after and solely because the
State obtained a deed for the property from
[the mortgagor] on December 16, 1936, in
satisfaction of its mortgage?
The State by
that deed could acquire only such title as its
grantor had at the time of the deed; that is, a
title encumbered by taxes theretofore lawfully
assessed and levied, and by prior tax sales, if
any.
85 P.2d at 854.
By its decision in State v. Salt Lake County, this Court
has recognized

that the County may issue a valid

tax deed

notwithstanding the fact a sovereign entity holds record title
thereto if the tax delinquencies exist prior to the sovereign's
acquisition

of

title.

Further

proposition that the statutory

the decision stands for the
right of redemption will run

against the sovereign as wello
The SBA could only acquire the interest of the grantor
pursuant to the quit-claim deed.

Prior to the execution of the

quit-claim deed in 1981, the property had been sold for taxes
in 1979 to Salt Lake County, subject to the statutory right of
redemption.

After

the preliminary

grantor

had

the

taxes *

Thus the SBA acquired a right to redeem the property

right

to

redeem

sale

to

by paying

the
the

County

the

delinquent

and once it failed to do so, its statutory right to redeem the
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property was extinguished,

Rushton v. Sage Land Co.

In United States v. Mever, 199 F.Supp. 508 (S.D.Ill.S.D.
1961), the United States filed federal tax liens against real
property

after

delinquent
United

issued.

preliminary

taxes but before

States

statutory

the

two

failed
year

to

period

In rejecting

the

sale

property

for

a tax deed had been issued.

The

redeem
of

of

the

property

redemption

United

the

and

States

during

the

a tax deed was

assertion

that

it's

liens preceded that of the tax deed purchaser, the court stated
as follows:
...the interest of the United States in
and to described property, became no greater
than the interest of the Hartman's which, under
the law of the State of Illinois, was a right
to redeem
from the state tax
sale,...and
the...United States, having failed to redeem
within the two year statutory and Illinois
constitutional period, defendant
Paul Meyer
became the owner of the real estate....
199 F.Supp. at 509-510.
Likewise the SBA had the opportunity to redeem prior to
the tax sale and elected not to do so.

Once the tax deed was

issued, the statutory right to redeem ceased to exist.

Where

an owner of land or anyone who has a right to take his place,
including

the

United

States,

lets

expire, it does so at his own peril.

the

period

of

redemption

United States v. Meyer.

In summary, because the statutory right of redemption is
not

a

vested

property

right,

sovereign

immunity

does

not

prevent the running of the statutory period for exercising that
right.
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When the SBA failed to exercise the right of redemption
it acquired from the grantors, the property was properly sold
by the County*
CONCLUSION
The special statute of limitations bars this action to
quiet title, which was commenced more than four years after the
execution of the tax deed pursuant to the 1984 May tax sale
conducted by Salt Lake County.

The statute will run even if

the deed may be invalid or voidable due to some jurisdictional
defect or irregularity

in the proceedings.

Further, because

the jurisdictional defect asserted by the Appellant is due to
the interest of the SBA in the subject property, the Appellant
lacks

standing

Appellant

to

assert

received

a

this

defect.

quit-claim

deed

At

the

time

the

from

the

SBA,

its

interest, which was the statutory right of redemption, had been
extinguished due to the SBA's failure to redeemc

Thus the 1984

May tax sale was valid as against the SBA8 grantee.
Respondent

Salt Lake County

respectfully

requests

the

Court uphold the decision of the trial court in its entirety.
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/ V^

day of July, 1990.
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